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Abstract
This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of
morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good
game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we
assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts.
The first one is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases
in the number of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being
pivotal. We analyze equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects
of guilt sharing, and compare results to standard utilitarian and non-
consequentialist approaches. As interventions, we study information
release, feedback, and fostering individual moral standards.
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1 Introduction
Many morally problematic acts and decisions require the support of several
people to become implementable, and often, morally difficult tasks are dele-
gated to groups instead of one individual alone. Extreme examples are so-called
“execution teams,” juries deciding about death penalties, and group military
activity such as shooting squads. There may be different reasons for these
arrangements. Certainly, they causally affect moral responsibility in people
involved. An expert in military psychology, Dave Grossman, stresses that in-
dividual barriers towards morally problematic activity often break when people
become part of teams or groups.1 In a related vein, studies from social psy-
chology (compare the overviews in Bandura 1999 and 2016) document that
diffusion of responsibility and shared guilt reduce moral conscience in peo-
ple. In addition, a diffused notion of being pivotal can decrease moral feelings
(compare Falk and Szech 2014). Various studies from economics and related
fields further document that people are heterogeneous in their moral behavior.
Some personalities adhere to higher moral standards than others, even across
different institutional contexts.2
Motivated by these findings, we analyze how moral costs affect individual sup-
port and outcomes in morally difficult group decisions. For this purpose, we
study a threshold public good game with moral costs. We assume that agents
are heterogeneous, and that moral costs consist of three terms. The first one
is a standard cost term. The second, shared guilt, decreases in the number
of supporters. The third hinges on the notion of being pivotal. We analyze
equilibrium predictions, isolate the causal effects of guilt sharing, and com-
pare results to standard utilitarian and non-consequentialist approaches. As
interventions, we study information release, feedback, and fostering individual
moral standards.
We first prove existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in which transgression can happen with positive probability. We focus
1Compare Grossman (1996): “The individual is not a killer, but the group is” (p. 149).
2See O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005), Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield (2000), Deckers, Falk,
Kosse and Szech (2016) for reviews of questionnaire and hypothetical scenario studies, and
e.g. Albrecht, Krämer and Szech (2016) and Deckers et al. (2016) for evidence from economic
settings. A related economic study focusing on social behavior is e.g. Bruhin, Fehr and
Schunk (2016).
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on this equilibrium throughout. Its outcome Pareto dominates the outcome of
the trivial equilibrium in which all agents remain passive. We find that this
Bayesian Nash equilibrium takes the form of a threshold equilibrium. Up to a
certain moral type, agents stay out, while agents above the threshold support
moral transgression.
An increase in individual moral standards, e.g. through training moral virtues,
unambiguously prevents moral transgression. Yet releasing additional informa-
tion to the agents, such that moral views become more spread out, can have
different effects. If selfish benefits from transgression are high, information
release can fight transgression. The opposite is true if selfish benefits are low.
The reason behind is that information release shifts probability mass both
into the upper and into the lower tail of the distribution of the agents’ moral
types. Morally “good” agents become better, and “bad” agents become worse.
A transgression that is only appealing to the morally worst agents can thus
materialize more likely if information is released, while a transgression that
requires the support of high moral types can become prevented more easily.
Information on the exact number of fellow supporters affects notions of being
pivotal, and thereby feelings of moral responsibility. In order to isolate the
role of feeling pivotal, we also analyze the variation of the model in which such
precise feedback is not provided. Again, there exist non-trivial, symmetric
Bayesian equilibria. These are also in threshold strategies. We find that the
thresholds are smaller than those in the basic model with feedback. Transgres-
sion becomes less likely as agents cannot clear their conscience from learning
that the transgression ‘would have happened anyway.’
We further contrast our findings with the case in which guilt does not diffuse in
the number of agents. The quantitative predictions differ drastically. The im-
pact of guilt diffusion is roughly comparable to multiplying the selfish benefit
by the number of required supporters: We observe a kind of ‘strategic equiv-
alence’ between the game in which guilt diffuses in the number of supporters,
and the comparison game with a much smaller selfish benefit. Precisely, the
selfish benefit is divided by the number of supporters needed, one agent less is
required, and the total group size is one agent less.
Finally, we compare our predictions to those of the companion model in which
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agents’ moral reasoning follows a non-consequentialist instead of a consequen-
tialist approach. What matters for feelings of guilt is now the intention, not
the outcome. If agents act as supporters, they face moral costs – regardless of
whether transgression materializes or not. In this model, symmetric equilibria
in which transgression occurs with positive probability only exist if the selfish
benefit from transgression is sufficiently high. If the benefit is large, there
exist multiple equilibria, all in threshold strategies. The equilibrium with the
highest transgression probability Pareto dominates.
1.1 Related Literature
Many previous applications of discrete public good games to morally relevant
action have studied the behavior of bystanders. Bystanders are people who
observe a crime or accident. Often they do not help the person in distress.
A rich empirical literature has documented that helping becomes less likely
if others could help as well. Helping drastically decreases in the number of
bystanders, see e.g. Darley and Latané (1968), Latané and Nida (1981), and
Fischer et al. (2011) for an overview of the literature on bystading. For a
victim, in order to receive help, it is often much better to have just one or
few bystanders than many. This finding has been coined as the “bystander
effect.” In social psychology and sociology, effects of shared and diffused guilt
and reduced feeling of breaking a norm have been put forward as explanations
for the bystander effect (see also Zimbardo 2007). Diffusion of guilt has also
been found to operate in committee situations (compare Bandura, Underwood
and Fromson 1975, Bandura 1999, 2016). In a related vein, empirical studies
have shown that a reduced notion of being pivotal decreases feelings of moral
responsibility, in individual decision contexts and in committees (Falk and
Szech 2014).3
In the game-theoretic literature on bystanding, such as Harrington (2001), Os-
borne (2004), and Crettez and Deloche (2011), mixed equilibrium effects have
been put forward as alternative explanations. If coordination is difficult, a high
individual likelihood of helping could result in very many bystanders helping.
This would be an unneeded overprovision of costly help. Therefore, in mixed
equilibrium, individual willingness to help is small, and drastically decreases
3Sobel (2010) analyzes perceptions of being pivotal in market trading.
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in the number of bystanders. These approaches assume that individual costs
of helping and not helping are independent of the number of other bystanders.
The standard game-theoretic approaches work well in a situation in which by-
standers cannot coordinate. They cannot explain the many empirical findings
as also overviewed in Fischer et al. (2011) in which bystanders see the behavior
of others such that an overprovision of help becomes unlikely. Yet also in these
situations, the bystanding effect emerges.
This motivates us to enrich the standard game-theoretic approach. Coordina-
tion remains an important factor. Agents hope that others provide support
instead of themselves. Yet moreover, costs of behaving in morally problematic
ways can be shared and thereby diffuse, and notions of being pivotal affect feel-
ings of guilt. Our model builds on the benchmark model due to Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1984). We extend this model by including incomplete information4
about other agents’ types and a richer model of how both, own behavior and
the behavior of others affect moral costs. This enables us to study the effects
of information provision and feedback. Moreover, we can analyze the impact
and interplay of different types of moral costs. The complete information game
possesses pure equilibria with perfect coordination as well as mixed equilib-
ria. In the incomplete information case, the pure equilibria break away while
the mixed equilibria survive. This renders the mixed equilibria specifically
relevant.
We first analyze the consequentialist moral perspective. Costs for immoral
activity only arise if transgression materializes. In Section 5.2, we contrast this
with a principle-based (Kantian) moral perspective under which moral costs do
not hinge on the actual outcome. This part of the analysis is related to Huck
and Konrad (2005) who consider mixed equilibria of a similar voting game with
complete information. They study a committee situation in which agents vote
about confiscating foreign investment. Confiscation leads to a selfish benefit
to the group yet voting for confiscation comes along with Kantian costs of
guilt. Guilt is thus independent of the voting outcome, and they assume that
it cannot be shared with others. They find that transgression, i.e. confiscation,
becomes less likely if the group size becomes larger.
4There exists a literature on public good games with incomplete information, e.g. Nitzan
and Romano (1990). Yet we are not aware of any contribution which addresses moral costs
or cost sharing in these settings.
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Dufwenberg and Patel (2015) also assume a complete information environment
and focus on pure equilibria. They add reciprocity preferences and cost-sharing
(similar to our guilt diffusion) to Palfrey and Rosenthal’s model. With this
combination (and in the absence of private information), they show that there
can be efficient equilibria which do not require coordination. An earlier appli-
cation of “diffusive” costs in complete information public good games is found
in Weesie and Franzen (1998) who study the “volunteer’s dilemma,” i.e. the
special case in which only one single agent needs to contribute.
Diffusion of moral costs further plays a crucial role in the analysis of Lindbeck,
Nyberg and Weibull (1999). They consider a continuum situation such that
coordination is always feasible. Agents need to decide if they want to work and
thereby support others, or if they want to free-ride on others’ contributions.
Opting for the latter comes with social stigma and thus with a morally relevant
cost, yet this cost decreases (and thus diffuses) the larger the fraction of free-
riders is. Agents are heterogeneous in their types such that the appeal of
working varies across them. Lindbeck et al. analyze the equilibria of this
model and demonstrate that sorting is feasible such that agents for whom
working is less costly work, while others free-ride. In a sense, these equilibria
have parallels to our threshold equilibrium in which agents with low moral cost
types support transgression, while others stay out.
2 Model and Basic Properties
This section introduces the morally relevant threshold public good game we are
going to study. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that moral
costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard
cost term. The second one is diffusive in the number of people sharing in. The
third one hinges on the notion of being pivotal.
We prove existence and uniqueness of a non-trivial, symmetric equilibrium.
We will rely on this equilibrium for all predictions.
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2.1 The Model
We consider n ≥ 1 agents who each face the decision to support a morally
difficult action. One may want to think about voting Yes for going to war
instead of No, or for taking some morally shaky business endeavor instead of
playing fair. The action (which we will also call transgression) requires the
support of at least k of these agents in order to materialize. We are thus in a
threshold public good game with moral costs.
We assume that if transgression happens, all agents receive a benefit V > 0
each (e.g. the country is defended, the group becomes richer etc.). Otherwise
each agent receives 0. Transgression is associated with moral costs. These
only accrue in the active supporters, i.e. in those who voted Yes instead of
No. Motivated by recent empirical research from economics, business ethics,
and social and military psychology, such as Bandura (1999, 2016), Deckers et
al. (2016), Falk and Szech (2013, 2014), Grossman (1996), Loe et al. (2000),
and Zimbardo (2007), these moral costs are heterogeneous and consist of three
terms. The first term is a standard cost from the transgression happening. The
second term captures guilt sharing and decreases in the number of supporters.
The third term hinges on the notion of being pivotal.
Each agent has a private moral type xi. Types are drawn independently from
a commonly-known, continuous distribution function F with F (0) = 0 whose
density function f is strictly positive over the support (0, a), a ∈ (0,∞] of
F . The three components of moral costs are parametrized by the non-
negative constants α, β and γ. The first one, α · xi, accrues if the agents
successfully supports the transgression. We will sometimes call it the non-
diffusive part in order to differentiate it from the second cost term. The second
moral cost term captures the concept of guilt sharing, β ·xi/Y . Y denotes the
total number of agents who support the transgression. Moral costs become
smaller the more supporters guilt can be shared with. Third, the agent faces a
cost of γ·xi which materializes if he is pivotal, i.e., if the transgression would not
have occurred without his support. If the transgression does not materialize,
we assume that agents do not feel guilty. We thus follow a consequentialist
approach.5 Agents who do not support the transgression do not face any moral
costs either.
5See Section 5.2 for a discussion of the corresponding non-consequentialist approach.
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The collective decision process is modeled as a threshold public good game.
Agents simultaneously opt either for Yes or No. If at least k agents choose Yes,
transgression happens. k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is commonly known. This game can be
interpreted as the result of a decision rule that was prescribed or agreed upon
beforehand. Alternatively, it can be thought of as a game of volunteering to
participate in an immoral action, and k as the minimum number of volunteers
needed to carry it out successfully.
To sum up, the realized utility of agent i from supporting immoral activity,







1{Y−i≥k−1} − γxi 1{Y−i=k−1} (1)
where Y−i denotes the number of agents other than i who act as supporters.
Realized utility from choosing No is
V 1{Y−i≥k}. (2)
We assume throughout that at least one of the guilt parameters α, β and γ is
positive.
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
The solution concept we employ is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We focus on
equilibria which are symmetric in the sense that agents with the same type
take the same moral decision.
For k > 1 there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all agents choose No
independent of their type. All agents receive a utility of 0 in this equilibrium.
As is common, e.g., in the voting-games and matching literatures, we ignore
this equilibrium in the following and focus on the Pareto-superior equilibria
in which the morally difficult action is taken with positive probability.6 As a
first main result, we find that there always exists exactly one equilibrium of
6As agents can guarantee themselves a non-negative payoff by choosing No, all agents
must earn a non-negative payoff in any equilibrium. Thus any agent strictly preferring Yes
in an equilibrium in which the morally difficult action is taken with positive probability,
must earn a strictly positive expected payoff.
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this type.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in which
transgression happens with positive probability. In this equilibrium, agent i opts
for Yes if xi ≤ θk,n, and for No if xi > θk,n. θk,n is the unique solution of




















If k < n, θk,n lies in the interior of the support of F , F (θk,n) ∈ (0, 1) such that
the equilibrium is a separating equilibrium.7
Equation (3) has a straightforward interpretation in terms of the costs and
benefits of a pivotal agent. The left hand side consists of the gains in utility
if the agent is pivotal, i.e. if exactly k − 1 other agents are willing to take
action. On the right hand side we find the expected costs of an agent with
threshold-type θk,n.
Uniqueness holds up to the decision of agents with type θk,n. These are indif-
ferent between Yes and No. We ignore this technicality in the following as it
only becomes relevant with a probability of zero.
Throughout the paper, we focus on three measures of moral transgres-
sion. θk,n captures individual willingness to support morally difficult activity.
Morally difficult behavior can increase on an individual level if institutional
design lowers moral costs, e.g. via introducing better possibilities for guilt
sharing. We measure such institutional effects on the individual by the quan-
tity θk,n, i.e. by the threshold-type who is indifferent between Yes and No.
Pk,n refers to the likelihood of transgression materializing. Nk,n is the num-
7We refer to equilibria in which agents’ actions depend on their types as “separating
equilibria.” Strictly speaking, they are only “semi-separating” as we cannot infer an agent’s
type from his action because there are infinitely many types and only two actions.
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ber of agents supporting transgression. Pk,n and Nk,n are thus outcome-based
measures, derived from the individual thresholds. The equilibrium probability




b(n, j, F (θk,n)),
and the according equilibrium expected number of supporters isNk,n = nF (θk,n).
3 Comparative Statics and Limit Behavior
In this section, we establish the comparative statics for the game, as well as
the convergence behavior as the number of agents grows large.
We analyze the comparative statics in the benefit V , the moral cost parameters
α, β, and γ, the number of supporters necessary k, and the overall group size




= H(F (θk,n), α, β, γ, k, n) (4)
with
H(F, α, β, γ, k, n) = γ +
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F )







The left hand side of (4) is strictly decreasing from +∞ to 0 in θ while
H(F (θ), α, β, γ, k, n) is increasing in θ with




The two functions thus intersect once, at the equilibrium threshold θk,n. There-
fore, if we wish to determine the comparative statics, e.g. the effect of an
increase in V on equilibrium thresholds, we can argue as follows. Increasing
V shifts the function V/θ upwards. The point of intersection and thus θk,n
accordingly move to the right. Increasing the benefit V therefore increases the
equilibrium threshold and thus induces more agents to support the transgres-
sion. The next proposition collects further basic properties of the equilibrium
threshold θk,n and the associated outcome-based measures Pk,n and Nk,n.
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Proposition 1.
(i) θk,n, Pk,n and Nk,n are increasing in the benefit V and decreasing in the cost
parameters α, β and γ.
(ii) If α + β > 0, θk,n and Nk,n are increasing in k.
The monotonicity behavior of θk,n and Nk,n in k can be interpreted as follows.
If k increases, i.e. if the number of supporters necessary increases, more agents
become willing to support the transgression both individually and overall, in
expectation. There are thus fewer agents who hope to free-ride on others with
lower moral standards who could support the transgression instead.
In the case α + β = 0, in which guilt purely depends on the notion of being





Thus, thresholds are independent of the voting rule and of the size of the group.
The reason behind is that agents compare their selfish benefit from transgres-
sion only to the cost that emerges if they turn out to be pivotal. Therefore,
there are no incentives to free-ride on others in this case. Accordingly, the
number of supporters Nk,n = nF (V/γ) is also independent of k, while Pk,n,
the probability of finding at least k supporters decreases with k.
The dependence of the transgression probability Pk,n on k is in general more
complex as demonstrated in Figure 1. The Figure shows that in a setting with
purely diffusive guilt (α = γ = 0), the probabilities form a U -shape. Trans-
gression probability is smallest for an intermediate level of k. The intuition
is as follows. If k is small, it is likely that there exist some agents with very
low moral types. These will implement the transgression. For larger k, higher
moral types would have to give their support. This only becomes an option
if guilt diffuses well, i.e. if very many agents are required. For intermedi-
ate values of k neither of the two mechanisms helps agent much to overcome
their moral concerns and, accordingly, immoral action materializes only with
comparatively small probability.8
8See Rothenhäusler, Schweizer and Szech (2015) for further discussion and some analyt-
ical results on this U -shape.
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Figure 1: Pk,25 as function of k for n = 25, V = 1, β = 1, α = γ = 0 and the
exponential distribution F (x) = 1− exp(−x).
These effects still play a role in the general model in which guilt can only partly
be shared, thereby precluding an easy comparative statics analysis of Pk,n. Yet
there is one crucial difference. If guilt has either a non-diffusive component
(α > 0) or there are costs from being pivotal (γ > 0) (and when the support of
F is unbounded), there will be some types who do not support transgression
regardless of k and n. These very moral agents render transgression for k close
to n less likely. The following lemma summarizes the results.
Lemma 1.





In particular, if the support of F is unbounded, there exists a positive mass of
agent types with high moral values who never support transgression, indepen-
dently of k and n.
(ii) If α = γ = 0, i.e. if guilt is fully diffusive as n grows large, for any type x
in the support of F there exist k and n such that x < θk,n. Thus any type x
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can become a supporter of transgression.
Finally, let us consider the limit results if the population size grows large.
Proposition 2. Suppose that α + β > 0. Then the following claims hold.
(i) limn→∞ θk,n = 0.
(ii) limn→∞Nk,n =∞.
(iii) limn→∞ Pk,n = 1.
While individual thresholds generally converge to 0, the expected number of
supporters Nk,n becomes arbitrarily large. We thus find an overshooting ef-
fect. In the limit, instead of the required k, infinitely many agents become
supporters. This holds even if only one supporter is necessary, and also if only
α is strictly positive and β is 0, i.e. if guilt does not diffuse. Instead of one,
infinitely many agents join in. Accordingly, the transgression probability Pk,n
converges to 1. The reason behind is that the number of agents with very
low moral standards grows that fast in n that it overrules the counteractive
effect from the threshold which decreases in n. There is uncertainty about
whether there are indeed many enough low types to free-ride on. This makes
many more agents think about joining in than necessary. Coordination is im-
possible, and the gains from a transgression that is supported by too many
are higher than the losses from the transgression not happening. In the case
α + β = 0, guilt only depends on notions of being pivotal. As shown in (6),
the thresholds θk,n are positive and independent of k and n. Also in that case,
(ii) and (iii) are satisfied.9
4 Interventions
In this section, we study the impact of three different interventions: training
agents’ individual moral virtues, increasing the precision of their information,
and varying whether they receive feedback about the number of supporters (as
in the basic model) or not.
9Each agent participates with a probability p = F (V/θ) that does not depend on n. This
implies Nk,n = np→∞ and leads to Pk,n → 1 far more directly than in the general case.
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4.1 Trained Virtues
Possibilities for training moral virtues have already been put forward by Aris-
toteles (see Barnes 1984). The idea of nudging agents towards more moral be-
havior has been discussed extensively in recent public debate, see e.g. Thaler
and Sunstein (2008). The next proposition demonstrates that an interven-
tion which induces an upwards shift in the distribution of moral types indeed
reduces all three measures of transgression. To this end, we compare two ver-
sions of our model with respective distributions F and G while we keep all
other parameters constant. We indicate the distribution dependence through
a superscript on the thresholds, θFk,n and θ
G
k,n, and analogously for all other
quantities.
Proposition 3. Suppose that G dominates F in terms of first order stochas-
tic dominance, G(x) ≤ F (x) for all x ≥ 0, so that G can be interpreted as a
(non-linear) upwards shift of F . Then it holds that θGk,n ≥ θFk,n, NGk,n ≤ NFk,n,
and PGk,n ≤ P Fk,n.
An upwards shift in the distribution of moral types thus establishes higher
moral standards in equilibrium. According to all three morally relevant mea-
sures, transgression decreases.
4.2 Information Release
We next investigate the effect of information release on moral outcomes. We
now interpret F as the distribution of (conditionally expected) moral costs,
based on coarse information. Through releasing information, a designer can
induce a more spread-out distribution G in which each agent has learned his
moral costs more precisely.10 To formalize the notion of G being more spread
out than F we rely on the following single-crossing criterion. G is more spread
out in the sense of the single-crossing criterion, G SC F , if there exists x0
such that F (x) ≤ G(x) for x ≤ x0 and G(x) ≤ F (x) for x ≥ x0. If F and
G share the same mean – as is the case if agents employ Bayesian updating –
single-crossing is a sufficient condition for G being a mean-preserving spread
of F .11
10This is in line with Ganuza and Penalva (2010)’s model of information release.
11See Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) for further discussion of this relation. We do not need
the assumption of F and G sharing the same mean and thus do not impose it.
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The next proposition demonstrates that the effect of information release cru-
cially depends on the potential benefits of the moral transgression, i.e. on the
level of V .
Proposition 4. Fix all parameters except for V and suppose that G is more
spread out than F in single-crossing precision, G  SCF . Then there exists
v0 ≥ 0 with the following properties.
For V ≥ v0, we have θGk,n ≥ θFk,n, NGk,n ≤ NFk,n, and PGk,n ≤ P Fk,n.
For V ≤ v0, we have θGk,n ≤ θFk,n, NGk,n ≥ NFk,n, and PGk,n ≥ P Fk,n.
Thus, additional information decreases transgression if stakes are high, but
increases transgression if stakes are low. This happens because information
release shifts probability mass both into the upper and into the lower tail.
Morally “good” agents become better, and “bad” agents become worse. If
stakes are low, only the worst agents in the population act as supporters. The
moral costs of these agents tend to decrease as the distribution becomes more
spread out. Therefore, transgression becomes more likely.
Conversely, if stakes are high, even good agents with high costs are near the
threshold of becoming supporters. As the upper tail of the distribution be-
comes more spread out, these agents tend to end up above the threshold and
thus do not become supporters. Hence transgression becomes less likely.
4.3 Feedback
In the baseline model, we assume that supporters of the transgression observe
the precise number of other supporters and share their guilt with these. In the
following, we contrast this baseline setting with the situation in which agents
only observe whether the transgression has occurred. Thus, they do not learn
the precise number of supporters. We call this counterpart model the game
without feedback.
In the game without feedback, utility from voting Yes is given by




1 + E[Y−i|Y−i ≥ k − 1]
)
1{Y−i≥k−1} + γ 1{Y−i=k−1}
)
,
where the conditional expectation is taken under the distribution induced by
equilibrium behavior. For instance, in an equilibrium in which agents vote Yes
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whenever their type is below the threshold θ̃k,n, this conditional expectation is
given by
E[Y−i|Y−i ≥ k − 1] =
∑n−1
j=k−1 j b(n− 1, j, F (θ̃k,n))∑n−1
j=k−1 b(n− 1, j, F (θ̃k,n)
.
The next proposition shows that symmetric equilibria of the game without
feedback are equilibria in threshold strategies, just like in the baseline model.
Such an equilibrium always exists, and the moral thresholds θ̃k,n in any such
equilibrium are higher than the thresholds θk,n in the corresponding baseline
model. Withholding feedback thus makes diffusion of guilt less effective, ren-
dering moral transgression less likely.12
Proposition 5. The game without feedback possesses a symmetric equilibrium
in which transgression happens with positive probability. All such equilibria are
equilibria in threshold strategies where the thresholds θ̃k,n solve
V
θ̃k,n
= H̃(F (θ̃k,n), α, β, γ, k, n) (7)
with
H̃(F, α, β, γ, k, n) = α
B(n− 1, k − 1, F )
b(n− 1, k − 1, F )
+ γ
+ β
B(n− 1, k − 1, F )




B(n−1,k−1,F )(1 + j)
and
B(n− 1, k − 1, F ) =
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F ).
Moreover, any solution θ̃k,n to (7) satisfies θ̃k,n ≥ θk,n where θk,n is the unique
equilibrium threshold of the baseline model with feedback.
Accordingly, the transgression probability P̃k,n and the expected number of
supports Ñk,n are smaller in this model. The lack of precise feedback makes it
harder for agents to excuse their behavior.
12We do not show uniqueness of equilibrium yet numerical results suggest that it holds.
We prove existence and a comparison between any equilibrium and the unique equilibrium
of the baseline model.
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5 Diffusion of Guilt
In this section, we further explore the effect of diffusion of guilt. Section 5.1
discusses the role of diffusion of guilt compared to the other components of
moral costs. Section 5.2 describes how predictions change if agents adopt a
non-consequentialist perspective, thus experiencing guilt whenever they act as
supporters – regardless of whether transgression actually happens.
5.1 Isolating the Effect of Diffusion
We will see that there is an almost substitutive relation between the diffusive
and the non-diffusive components of moral costs. By and large, if guilt is
completely diffusive (α = 0) predictions are quite comparable to the case in
which guilt is completely non-diffusive (β = 0) but where the benefit V from
transgression is almost k times larger. Theorem 2 specifies this relationship in
all precision.
Theorem 2. Denote by θk,n(α, β, γ, V ) the equilibrium threshold of the game
with parameters α,β,γ,V , k and n as defined in (4).
(i) Fix w ∈ [0, 1] and α0 > 0 and define θ1 and θ2 as the equilibrium thresholds
of the game without diffusion (β = 0) for (k, n) and for (k + 1, n+ 1),
θ1 = θk,n(α0, 0, γ, V ) and θ2 = θk+1,n+1(α0, 0, γ, V ).
Then it holds that
min(θ1, θ2) ≤ θk,n(wα0, k(1− w)α0, γ, V ) ≤ max(θ1, θ2).
(ii) For any δ > 0, we have θk,n(0, δ, 0, V ) = θk+1,n+1(δ, 0, 0, k · V ).
(iii) We have the bound






θk,n(α, β, γ, V ).
The theorem demonstrates a kind of strategic equivalence between the game
with n agents out of whom k are required for transgression to happen and guilt
diffuses in the number of supporters, and the comparison game in which guilt
does not diffuse. The number of agents needs to be mildly adjusted by one,
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both for the group size and for the number of agents required. The benefit
from transgression needs to be inflated by k.
Part (i) illustrates that up to adjusting between (k, n) and (k+1, n+1), decreas-
ing the non-diffusive guilt term still leads to the same equilibrium thresholds
if the diffusive term is increased by k-times that amount. Part (ii) focuses
on the case in which notions of being pivotal do not affect guilt, γ = 0. Up
to adjusting k and n by one, if guilt diffuses, (α, β) = (0, δ), equilibrium
thresholds are identical to those of the game with perfectly non-diffusive guilt,
(α, β) = (δ, 0) if the benefit V is inflated by k.13 Part (iii) assesses quanti-
tatively how the diffusive component of guilt affects equilibrium thresholds.
Equilibrium thresholds of the two games with β > 0 and β = 0, lie within a
factor 1 + β
kα
of each other. This holds independently of the distribution of
moral types, F . For fixed α and β, the impact of the diffusive guilt compo-
nent on equilibrium behavior vanishes quickly as k increases. Guilt sharing
between agents is then so strong that this costs component has little impact
on the agents’ behavior.
5.2 A Non-Consequentialist View
So far, guilt hinged on consequences of actions instead of intent. In this section,
we focus on the latter. Under this non-consequentialist (or Kantian) moral
perspective, agents face moral costs from choosing Yes, independent of the
outcome.14 As before, we assume that agents share guilt with other supporters,
while notions of being pivotal play not role anymore as consequences do not
affect guilt.
The following dichotomy emerges. For small values of the selfish benefit V ,
the equilibrium in which all agents opt against transgression is the unique
symmetric equilibrium. For larger V , there are several symmetric equilibria in
which the transgression occurs with strictly positive probability. The equilib-
rium with the highest transgression probability Pareto-dominates.
13This is, of course, not a strategic equivalence in the strictest sense as the number of
agents mildly varies across the two games.
14In the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we compare our basic model, a sub-
scription game, to the associated contribution game.
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We thus dropped the term that captured notions of being pivotal which was
inherently consequentialist. Realized utility from voting No is given by
V 1{Y−i≥k}.
The following proposition shows that – under mild conditions – transgression
occurs in equilibrium only if V is sufficiently large.
Proposition 6.
(i) For sufficiently large V , there exist symmetric equilibria in which trans-




= H̄(F (θ̄k,n), α, β, k, n) (9)
with
H̄(F, α, β, k, n) =
n−1∑
j=0
b(n− 1, j, F )













k,n both solve (9), they both correspond to




(ii) Assume f(0) < ∞ and k > 2. Then, for sufficiently large V , there exist
at least two symmetric equilibria in which transgression occurs with positive
probability.
(iii) Assume f(0) < ∞ and k > 1. Then, for small V , the unique symmetric
equilibrium is the one in which all agents choose No.
Thus, in equilibrium, small temptations V do not cause moral transgression
– but sufficiently large ones do. This is due to a “two-sided” coordination
problem. For an agent, in addition to the possibility of free-riding on other
agents’ Yes-votes, opting for No has another appeal. It avoids the risk of facing
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moral costs without reaping any benefits. This two-sided coordination problem
also causes the multiplicity of equilibria in case (ii).
6 Conclusion
We analyzed how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult
group decisions, studying a threshold public good game. Empirical studies
from economics, psychology, sociology and business ethics motivated us to
assume that agents are heterogeneous in their moral costs, and that these
costs consist of three parts: a standard cost term, a shared guilt term that
decreases in the number of supporters, and a cost term that hinges on the
notion of being pivotal.
We proved existence and uniqueness of a symmetric non-trivial equilibrium,
and analyzed the comparative statics of the model. We found that increasing
the number of supporters necessary for transgression to materialize does not
necessarily reduce transgression. As supporters can share their guilt, trans-
gression can instead become more likely if many supporters become active.
Furthermore, while an increase in individual moral types prevents transgres-
sion, information release can have counteractive effects if selfish benefits from
transgression are small. Moreover, the provision of feedback can make it easier
for agents to support transgression. The chance to learn that they were not
pivotal reduces their feelings of moral responsibility. This effect can be strong
enough to increase the likelihood of moral transgression.
Economic models of group activity in morally relevant contexts are rare. No-
table exceptions are Huck and Konrad (2005) looking into committee decisions
on confiscating foreign investments, Sobel (2010) analyzing moral responsibil-
ity in market activity, and Huesmann and Wambach (2015) studying mecha-
nisms for rewarding dangerous services of moral relevance. If people engage in
“psychosocial manoeuvres – often aided by the institutions [...], which absolve
them from moral responsibility for harmful acts” (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010, p.
812), further research is needed to understand and disentangle the mechanisms
behind institutionally driven moral transgression. This paper contributes to
this endeavor. Speaking with the social psychologist Albert Bandura (1999,
p. 297), “...societies cannot rely entirely on individuals to deter human cru-
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elty. Civilized life requires, in addition to human personal codes, effective
social safeguards against the misuse of power for exploitative and destructive
purposes.” We believe that economic research can and should contribute to
shaping such social safeguards.
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show that all equilibria, symmetric or not, in
which transgression happens with positive probability must be equilibria in
threshold strategies. For each agent i, there is a threshold θk,n,i ∈ [0,∞] such
that i votes Yes if xi < θk,n,i and No if xi > θk,n,i. To see this, fix the strategies
of the other agents. In an equilibrium in which transgression happens with
positive probability, at least k− 1 of the other agents must vote Yes with pos-
itive probability. Assume agent i weakly prefers voting Yes over No for some
type xi. Comparing the expectations of (1) and (2) implies that this preference
must be strict for all lower types. Likewise, if agent i weakly prefers voting No
over Yes for some type xi, this preference must be strict for all higher types.
Thus, all best responses to the other agents’ strategies are threshold strategies.
Therefore, all equilibria in which transgression happens with positive proba-
bility are equilibria in threshold strategies.15
For k < n, we now show that there exists a unique threshold θk,n > 0 with the
property that if all agents play a threshold strategy with θk,n, an agent with
type θk,n is indifferent between voting Yes and No. We treat the case k = n
separately at the end. Consider an agent with type x and assume that all
other agents follow a threshold strategy with θk,n > 0. Expected payoff from
voting Yes is then given by
n−1∑
j=k−1










− b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n)) γ x (10)
where the Binomial distribution arises as the other agents independently vote
15As the equilibrium in which all agents always vote No is also in threshold strategies, it
follows that in fact all symmetric equilibria are in threshold strategies.
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Yes with probability F (θk,n). Expected payoff from voting No is given by
n−1∑
j=k
b(n− 1, j, F (θk,n))V. (11)
Equilibria are characterized by thresholds θk,n for which the two expressions
coincide for x = θk,n. Equating (10) and (11) for x = θk,n yields condition (3)
as stated in the proposition. It remains to show existence of a unique (positive)
solution. To this end, we write (3) as
V
θk,n
= H(F (θk,n), α, β, γ, k, n) (12)
with
H(F, α, β, γ, k, n) = γ +
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F )







The left hand side of (12) is strictly decreasing in θk,n, diverging to ∞ at 0

















we see that it strictly increases from α + β
k
+ γ to ∞ as θk,n moves through
the support of F . This proves the existence of a unique solution θk,n in the
interior of the support.
It remains to study the case k = n. Like in the case of k < n, an interior














In the case where this choice of θn,n lies above the support of F (and only
then), all agents voting Yes regardless of their type is an equilibrium.16
16The separating equilibrium thus degenerates to a pooling equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 1. By (12), θk,n is characterized as the intersection be-
tween the decreasing function V/θk,n and the function H which is increasing
in θk,n via F . Increasing the decreasing function V/θk,n by increasing V neces-
sarily shifts the point of intersection to the right, thus increasing θk,n. Similarly,
θk,n decreases in α, β and γ: Increasing any of these parameters increases the
function H, thus shifting the intersection to the left. The claims about Nk,n
and Pk,n in (i) follow from the behavior of θk,n: Nk,n and Pk,n can be seen
as the mean and the probability of observing a realization above k − 1 for a
binomial distribution with “success probability” F (θk,n). Both quantities in-
crease in this probability. To prove (ii), we first show the following alternative
representation of the function H:
H(F, α, β, γ, k, n) = α
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F )






b(n, j, F )
b(n, k, F )
+ γ. (15)
To see this, we rewrite the part of H which depends on β. Observe first the
following connection between binomial distributions for (k−1, n−1) and (k, n):
n−1∑
j=k−1




































b(n, l, F ).
Combining this identity with b(n− 1, k − 1, F ) = k
nF
b(n, k, F ) yields
β
∑n−1
j=k−1 b(n− 1, j, F )
1
1+j





j=k b(n, j, F )
b(n, k, F )
and thus (15). From (15), we can conclude that H is decreasing in k. This
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follows immediately from the fact that both∑n−1
j=k−1 b(n− 1, j, F )
b(n− 1, k − 1, F )
and
∑n
j=k b(n, j, F )
b(n, k, F )
are reciprocals of the failure rate of the Binomial distribution which is increas-
ing in k, see Johnson, Kotz and Kemp (1992), Chapter 3. Consequently, θk,n is
increasing in k as an increase in k decreases H and thus shifts the intersection
of V/θ and H to the right. As Nk,n = nF (θk,n) depends on k only through
θk,n, it increases in k as well.
Proof of Lemma 1. To see (i), note that H(F, α, β, γ, k, n) ≥ α + γ. Thus,
(12) implies V/θk,n ≥ α + γ. To see (ii), note that by (14) the threshold θn,n
becomes θn,n = nV/β for α = γ = 0. θn,n thus becomes arbitrarily large as n
increases.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of (i) proceeds in two steps. We first show
that it suffices to prove the result for the case α = γ = 0. Then we prove (i)
for this case. Let θ′k,n be the equilibrium threshold with parameters α
′ = 0,
γ′ = 0 and β′ = α + β. By the definition of H, we have
H(F, α, β, γ, k, n) ≥ H(F, 0, α + β, 0, k, n).
If θ′k,n < θk,n, then by this equation we would have
V
θ′k,n




which is a contradiction. Hence, we have the bound θ′k,n ≥ θk,n and θ′k,n → 0
implies θk,n → 0.
We prove θ′k,n → 0 by contradiction. Suppose (i) is violated for θ′k,n, i.e.
suppose that there exists a subsequence nj of N and ε > 0 such that θ′k,nj ≥

































F (ε)i(1− F (ε))nj−i.






polynomially in nj and (1 − F (ε))nj−i decays exponentially in nj. Now we





















































grows polynomially in nj and (1− F (ε))nj−i decays
exponentially in nj, the final term converges to 0. This is a contradiction as we
proved in (16) that the left hand side of (17) converges to 1. This completes
the proof of (i).
The proof of (ii) proceeds in two similar steps. We first argue that we can
focus on the case in which the diffusive guilt term is absent, and then prove
the result for this case. Let θ′k,n now be the equilibrium threshold for the case
α′ = α + β, γ′ = γ and β′ = 0. By definition,
H(F, α, β, γ, k, n) ≤ H(F, α + β, 0, γ, k, n).
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If θ′k,n > θk,n, then by this inequality
V
θk,n
= H(F (θk,n), α, β, γ, k, n) ≤ H(F (θ′k,n), α + β, 0, γ, k, n) =
V
θ′k,n
which is a contradiction. Hence, we have θ′k,n ≤ θk,n, and it suffices to show that
nF (θ′k,n) → ∞. To this end, consider a subsequence nl such that nlF (θk,nl)′






b(n− 1, j, F (θ′k,n))
b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ′k,n))
(α + β) . (18)
Calculating the limits for l→∞ results in
lim
l








































b(n− 1, j, F (θ′k,n)) = 1−
k−2∑
j=0







Hence, along the subsequence, the right hand side of (18) converges to











But, as shown in part (i) of the proposition, the left hand side of (18) diverges
to ∞. This is a contradiction. Hence there exists no such subsequence nl.
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Thus nF (θ′k,n)→∞.
It remains to prove (iii). For this purpose, fix k and V and let κ > 0
be arbitrary. By part (ii) of the proposition, nF (θk,n) → ∞. Thus, for n






































































which converges to 1 as κ→∞.
Proof of Proposition 3. Throughout the proof, we drop the dependence of H
on (α, β, γ, k, n), writing just H(F ). In the proof of Theorem 1, we saw that
H(F ) is increasing. By assumption, we have H(F (θ)) ≥ H(G(θ)) and thus
V
θFk,n
= H(F (θFk,n)) ≥ H(G(θFk,n)),
implying that θFk,n lies to the left of the unique intersection of V/θ and H(G(θ)).
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implies F (θFk,n) ≥ G(θGk,n) by the monotonicity of H. The latter inequality
implies the results for Nk,n and Pk,n.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof extends the one of Proposition 3. Note that
the functions H(F (θ)) and H(G(θ)) inherit the single-crossing property of F
and G. Denote by x0 > 0 a point of intersection of F and G and define
v0 = x0H(F (x0)) such that v0/θ intersects both H(F (θ)) and H(G(θ)) for




k,n = x0. For V > v0, it
follows that both, θFk,n and θ
G
k,n lie in [x0,∞]. For θ ∈ [x0,∞], we know by the
single-crossing condition that H(F (θ)) ≥ H(G(θ)). For V > v0, it thus follows
as in the proof of Proposition 3 that θFk,n ≤ θGk,n and F (θFk,n) ≥ G(θGk,n), implying
the results about Nk,n and Pk,n. The argument for V < v0 is analogous, using
that the ranking of F and G is reversed on [0, x0].
Proof of Proposition 5. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 1, best responses
to any non-trivial strategies of the other agents must be threshold strategies.
This implies that equilibria must be in threshold strategies. Consider agent i
of type xi who faces opponents who play a threshold strategy with threshold
θk,n. In determining a symmetric equilibrium in threshold strategies, the sole
difference to the proof of Theorem 1 lies in the diffusive part of the expected
cost from voting Yes. We now obtain
P (Y−i ≥ k − 1)
β xi
E[1 + Y−i|Y−i ≥ k − 1]











= H̃(F (θ̃k,n), α, β, γ, k, n) (20)
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with
H̃(F, α, β, γ, k, n) = α
B(n− 1, k − 1, F )
b(n− 1, k − 1, F )
+ γ (21)
+ β
B(n− 1, k − 1, F )




B(n−1,k−1,F )(1 + j)
. (22)
The function H̃(F, α, β, γ, k, n) is continuous in F and satisfies




Moreover, it is bounded from below by α + β
n
+ γ > 0. The last claim follows
from (21) because of the estimates b(n− 1, k− 1, F ) ≤ B(n− 1, k− 1, F ) and
j+1 ≤ n. As V/θ is arbitrarily large for small θ and arbitrarily small for large
θ, it follows that (20) possesses at least one solution θ̃k,n > 0. To complete
the proof of the proposition, we need to show that any solution θ̃k,n satisfies
θ̃k,n ≥ θk,n. To prove this, we show that H̃(F, α, β, γ, k, n) ≤ H(F, α, β, γ, k, n).
The result then follows from the monotonicity of V/θ in θ. To compare H̃ and
H, it suffices to compare the β-dependent diffusive terms in (5) and (21).
Applying Jensen’s inequality with the convex function h(x) = 1/x and the
probability distribution with probabilities b(n− 1, j, F )/B(n− 1, k − 1, F ) on
k, . . . , n, we find that
B(n− 1, k − 1, F )




B(n−1,k−1,F )(1 + j)
≤B(n− 1, k − 1, F )
b(n− 1, k − 1, F )
n−1∑
j=k−1
b(n− 1, j, F )






b(n− 1, j, F )
b(n− 1, k − 1, F )
1
1 + j
and thus H̃(F, α, β, γ, k, n) ≤ H(F, α, β, γ, k, n).
Proof of Theorem 2. We begin with claim (i). To simplify the notation, we
define functions h1(θ) and h2(θ) by
h1(θ) =
B(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ))
b(n− 1, k − 1, F (θ))
and h2(θ) =
B(n, k, F (θ))
b(n, k, F (θ))
,
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and notice that due to (15), the following identity holds:
H(F (θ), α, β, γ, k, n) = αh1(θ) +
β
k
h2(θ) + γ. (23)
The thresholds θi, i = 1, 2 defined in the proposition solve Li(θi) = 0 where
the strictly increasing functions Li are given by




It follows that for the strictly increasing function
Lw(θ) = wL1(θ) + (1− w)L2(θ), w ∈ (0, 1),
there exists a unique θw with the properties that Lw(θw) = 0 and
min(θ1, θ2) < θw < max(θ1, θ2),
i.e. the unique zero of a convex combination of the strictly increasing functions
h1 and h2 lies between the unique zeros of these functions. It thus remains to
show that θw = θk,n(wα0, k(1− w)α0, γ, V ). This follows from the observation
that by (23),




h2(θ) + γ −
V
θ




To see (ii), observe that it follows from (23) that
H(F (θ), 0, δ, 0, k, n) = k ·H(F (θ), δ, 0, 0, k + 1, n+ 1)
which immediately leads to the result. We finally prove (iii). Define the short
notation θ = θk,n(α, β, γ, V ) and θ
′ = θk,n(α, 0, γ, V ). By Proposition 1, we
have θ ≤ θ′. Note further that





= H(F (θ), α, β, γ, k, n)





























Proof of Proposition 6. Throughout the proof, we do not use the exact func-
tional form of how guilt depends on the total number y of Yes votes. Instead we
assume that shared guilt takes the form of x/s(y) where x denotes an agent’s
type and s is an increasing, positive function in y. This shortens the notation











Let us prove the first assertion. We look for θ > 0 where the expected payoff
of voting No is equal to the expected payoff of voting Yes, i.e. we look for




b(n−1, j, F (θ)) = V
n−1∑
j=k−1





b(n−1, j, F (θ)),
(25)
i.e.





b(n− 1, j, F (θ)). (26)
The right hand side is nonegative, 0 for θ = 0, and diverges to ∞ for θ →∞.
The left hand side is bounded, continuous in θ and positive for θ > 0. This
implies that for large V there exists at least one nontrivial solution θ > 0 to
this equation. A solution θ of equation (25) is the threshold of a symmetric
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Bayesian equilibrium in which each agent i votes Yes if xi ≤ θ and No if xi > θ
as the expected utility of voting Yes decreases in xi.
Now let us turn to the second assertion. Analogously as in Proposition 1, all
symmetric Bayesian equilibria must be in threshold strategies. The case in
which the threshold is ∞ is trivial. Let us look again at (26). We want to
show that this equation has no solution θ > 0 for small V . For large θ,





b(n− 1, j, F (θ)).
Thus, by continuity in θ, it suffices to show that for small θ > 0 and small V ,














b(n− 1, j, F (θ)) (27)
with



























for small θ as F (θ)/θ → F ′(0) and F (θ)→ 0 for θ → 0. This proves the claim.
Now let us turn to the third assertion. Similarly as in (27) and (28), one can
show that





b(n− 1, j, F (θ))
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for a fixed (arbitrary large) V if θ > 0 is small enough. Hence, by continuity
and positivity of both terms for θ > 0, for large V there are at least two
positive solutions to (26) with at least one solution satisfying F (θ) < 1. Thus,






b(n− 1, j, F (θ)) (29)
is weakly decreasing in θ. By linearity, and as the function s(1 + j) is weakly
increasing, this claim can be reduced to the well-known fact that
m∑
j=0
b(n− 1, j, F (θ))
is weakly decreasing in θ for m ≤ n− 1.




k,n two solutions of (25) which correspond to
two different threshold strategies, i.e. F (θ̄
(1)
k,n) < F (θ̄
(2)
k,n). We show that the
equilibrium associated with the second threshold strategy strictly Pareto dom-
inates the first. This argument also covers the trivial equilibrium θ̄
(1)
k,n = 0.










b(n− 1, j, F (θ̄(i)k,n))
for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The expected payoff is larger in the second equilibrium as the first term is
increasing whereas the second term is weakly decreasing, see (29). The case
θ̄
(2)
k,n < x can be treated similarly. In the case θ̄
(2)
k,n < x ≤ θ̄
(2)
k,n, we have to















b(n− 1, j, F (θ̄(2)k,n)).
We use F (θ̄
(1)
k,n) < F (θ̄
(2)




























b(n− 1, j, F (θ̄(1)k,n))
which proves the claim.
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[16] Ganuza, Juan-José and José Penalva. Signal Orderings Based on Disper-
sion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions. Econometrica,
78: 1007-1030, 2010.
[17] Grossman, Dave. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill
in War and Society. Little Brown, Toronto, 1996
35
[18] Haidt, Jonathan, and Selin Kesebir. Morality. Handbook of Social Psy-
chology, 5th Edition. Chapter 22. Fiske, S., Gilbert, D., Lindzey, G.
(Eds.), Wiley, New York, 2010.
[19] Harrington, Joseph. A simple game-theoretic explanation for the relation-
ship between group size and helping. Journal of Mathematical Psychology,
45, 389-392, 2001.
[20] Huck, Steffen, and Kai Konrad. Moral cost, commitment and committee
size. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161(4), 575-588,
2005.
[21] Huesmann, Katharina, and Achim Wambach. Constraints on Matching
Markets Based on Moral Concerns. Working Paper, 2015.
[22] Johnson, Norman, Samuel Kotz, and Adrienne Kemp. Univariate discrete
distributions. 2nd edition, Wiley, New York, 1992.
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